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Abstract In Vietnam, villagers involved in a REDD+ (re-
duced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation)
pilot protect areas with rocks which have barely a tree on
them. The apparent paradox indicates how actual practices
differ from general ideas about REDD+ due to ongoing con-
flict over forest, and how contestations over the meaning of
justice are a core element in negotiations over REDD+. We
explore these politics of justice by examining how the actors
involved in the REDD+ pilot negotiate the particular subjects,
dimensions, and authority of justice considered relevant, and
show how politics of justice are implicit to practical decisions
in project implementation. Contestations over the meaning of
justice are an important element in the practices and processes
constituting REDD+ at global, national and local levels, chal-
lenging uniform definitions of forest justice and how forests
ought to be managed.
Keywords Forest . Justice . Politics . Reduced emissions
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Introduction
REDD+ (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation) is a global initiative that seeks to mitigate climate
change by decreasing losses of the world’s remaining natural
forests or other reductions in forest carbon stocks (e.g.,
Angelsen 2009). At the same time, REDD+ has given rise to
significant contestations over the justice of tropical forest man-
agement at the global level (for example, how differences in
benefits and costs, in influence on decision-making, and in
understanding of relevant actors should be handled). Efforts
to protect forest people’s rights, needs, and visions are reflected
in the REDD+ Safeguards, which provide unprecedented glob-
al recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to forests (Savaresi
2013). The same efforts have led international donors to fund
‘indigenous REDD+ pilots’ for developing approaches to
REDD+ that accord indigenous peoples a central role.1
Yet, Norway’s Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD) is funding an indigenous REDD+ pilot in
Vietnam where there is barely a tree on the limestone rocks
surrounding the 20 villages included in the project. Moreover,
the villagers involved in the pilot project include not only
ethnic minority Tay, Nung, and Dao people but also majority
Viet. The project invites all local households to participate
regardless of ethnicity and settlement history. The only signif-
icant patch of natural forest left in the area has not been in-
cluded in the project, although it has long been managed by
Dao ethnic minority villagers and, therefore, would neatly fit
the purposes of indigenous REDD+.
This paradox, we suggest, contains broader insights about
REDD+. Specific REDD+ practices rarely fit general ideas
1 For example, NORAD has funded a number of pilot projects on
REDD+; see http://www.norad.no/en/front/funding/climate-and-forest-
initiative-support-scheme/grants-2009-2012
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about REDD+ because they develop on top of ongoing strug-
gles and conflict over forests (cf. Mahanty et al. 2013).
Variation in the practice of REDD+ is not due to aberrations
from a grand plan – whether environmental, neoliberal, or
neocolonial – but because practices and processes at global,
national and local levels constitute a set of negotiated and
highly varied arrangements. It is only through specific prac-
tices in particular settings that REDD+ is realized, i.e., forest
management practices on the ground as much such as negoti-
ations at global summits. Moreover, justice is at the core of
negotiations over REDD+, whether international negotiations
and national policy debates about equity and governance or
local struggles over forest management. Justice concerns are
implicit to practical matters commonly encountered in the
design and implementation of REDD+ actions.
Here we investigate the practices and processes constituting
REDD+ through an examination of a REDD+ pilot implement-
ed by a Vietnamese non-govermental organization (NGO) from
2011 to 2014 in northern Vietnam. We analyze how the imple-
mentation of the project affected ongoing negotiations over
forests at the site, how various social actors invoked REDD+
in their claims on forests, and how existing conflicts influenced
the implementation of the REDD+ pilot. Our particular interest
is with a specific element in conflict over forest, which we term
politics of justice and refers to contestations over the meaning
of justice, i.e., the particular notions social actors attribute to
justice in a specific context. We are interested less in investi-
gating the effects of REDD+ on differentiated social actors, or
the issues of distribution, participation, and recognition raised
by its implementation (Leggett and Lovell 2012; Mathur et al.
2014), but rather in focusing on social actors’ ideas about what
just forest governance is about, how REDD+ would have to be
conducted to serve justice, and how these ideas have influenced
actual forest management practices. Struggles over themeaning
of forest justice, we argue, are a critical element in conflict over
forest and the practices and processes constituting REDD+.
We begin with a review of the literature on conflict
over forest to develop a simple framework for examining
the politics of forest justice organized around three param-
eters: subjects, dimensions, and authority. We then intro-
duce important background on negotiations over forests in
contemporary Vietnam and global struggles over REDD+.
In the following section, we analyze negotiations over
practical elements of the REDD+ pilot – the location of
the project, the selection of the forest to be protected, the
designation of eligible participants, the procedures to fa-
cilitate their participation, and decisions about what par-
ticipants receive in return for forest protection – and syn-
thesize the underlying politics of forest justice along the
three parameters of subjects, dimensions, and authority.
We conclude by developing the implications of our em-
pirical insights for more general understanding of politics
of justice and REDD+.
Conflict Over Forest and Politics of Justice
Justice concerns are an integral part of the normative arrange-
ments underpinning forestry. They commonly inform everyday
claims on forests along the lines of Peluso’s (1996) ‘ethics of
access’.2 Ethical concerns act as ‘motivator of behavior’
(Peluso 1996: 515) in the sense that considerations of intra-
and intergenerational justice among others influence forest
management practices. They also influence access to and con-
trol over forests by lending legitimacy to some forest claims
and withholding others (Fortmann 1995). The ethical underpin-
nings are not fixed in time nor do they apply uniformly within a
particular social setting. They can be specific to particular re-
sources (Peluso 1996) and change over time in response to
wider political and economic changes. Nonetheless, ethics of
access inform claims people make on forests and their forest
management practices, thereby mediating the influence of
broader economic and political forces (Sowerwine 2011).
Ethical considerations are an important element of environ-
mental politics, whereby the ethical notions applied by various
social actors tend to be plural. In Peluso’s (1996) case, vil-
lagers developed different ‘ethics of access’ to durian, other
fruit trees, and rubber. Moreover, villagers’ notions differed
from those informing state governance interventions such as
privatization. In environmental justice scholarship, it is recog-
nized that multiple notions of justices are found amongst di-
verse actors (Sikor 2013a; Walker 2011; see also He and Sikor
2015; Martin et al. 2014).
Consequently, conflict over forests may arise because so-
cial actors disagree on applicable notions of justice. As people
disagree on the meaning of justice, they may contest justice
along three key parameters: subjects, dimensions, and author-
ity (cf. Fraser 2009). First, claims on forest may invoke dif-
ferent subjects of justice, i.e., which social actors are consid-
ered to legitimately possess rights and bear responsibilities
relating to forest. For example, Peluso (1996) explains how
both lineages and individuals (as different subjects) possess
certain rights to forests: inheritance rights to durian and other
fruit trees are shared within lineages, while individuals acquire
rights to fruits through labor investment. Bose (2013) de-
scribes the tension between the Indian Forest Rights Act,
which calls for the formalization of customary rights on a
household basis, and tribal people’s assertion of collective
forest rights on the basis of their collective identity. Elmhirst
(2011) notes how negotiations over access to forests in
Indonesia simultaneously involve contestations over subjects,
since women are granted access through membership in a
household rather than as individual citizens.
2 Arguably, this also applies to state forestry and the forestry profession,
for which priority on ‘the common good’ and national development have
been foundational (Peluso 1992).
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Second, forest claims may assert different dimensions of
justice, which can be broadly distinguished as redistribution,
representation, and recognition (Schlosberg 2004; Walker
2011), and some dimensions of justice may be more valued
than others in given socio-political contexts or by certain ac-
tors. Different dimensions of justice may explain why vil-
lagers may resist co-management initiatives, evenwhere those
deliver tangible benefits: aspects of participation and recogni-
tionmay bemore important to them than redistributive actions
(Edmunds and Wollenberg 2003). Similarly, the Indian gov-
ernment’s redistribution of individual tenure rights to tribal
households encounters opposition because it does not meet
their demands for recognition of traditional kinship relations
and connectedness to ancestral land (Bose 2013). Benefit-
sharing arrangements in Uganda intended to distribute bene-
fits from forests fail to respond to indigenous Batwa demands
for recognition of historical experiences of economic and cul-
tural marginalization (Martin et al. 2015).
Third, conflict over forest may be due to claims invoking
competing institutions of authority to realize justice (cf. Sikor
and Lund 2009). Forest claims require authorization by insti-
tutions to be recognized as legitimate. For example, negotia-
tions over forests in Albania and Romania call upon local
governments, central government agencies and various cus-
tomary institutions to sanction rights (Sikor et al. 2009). In
Vietnam, conflict over forest is not simply due to discrepancy
between state and customary rules but also because villagers
justify their claims in reference to both state and customary
rules, thereby contributing to the constitution of state and cus-
tomary authority over forest (Sikor 2011b). More broadly, the
devolution of forest tenure rights to local communities opens
up grounds for new contestations over what kinds and rules of
authority should apply (Larson et al. 2010).
Thus, contestations over the meaning of justice involving the
three parameters of subjects, dimensions and authority are a key
element in conflict over forest. Conflict arises as a result of
politics of justice originating from multiple notions of justice.
Forest Politics in Vietnam andGlobal Struggles Over
REDD+
Negotiations Over Forests in Contemporary Vietnam
The people living in and around forests in Vietnam come
from a wide range of cultural and historical backgrounds
including majority Viet as well as 53 state-classified ethnic
minorities. Ethnic minorities account for 14 % of the na-
tional population and are largely concentrated in the up-
lands, where most of the country’s forests are located
(Sikor 2011a). They are generally considered to have lived
longer in the uplands than the Viet, who started to migrate
there in larger numbers in the 1950s (Hardy 2003).
Vietnam’s constitution grants equal citizenship rights to all
people regardless of their ethnicity, while recognizing ethnic-
ity as an individual attribute. After gaining independence in
1954, the Vietnamese Communist Party quickly abandoned a
previous policy based on the Soviet policy of recognizing the
right of self-determination for some peoples and instead
sought to unify all ethnic groups under the premise that the
ethnic minorities share a common country with the Viet, and
has ruled out any recognition of ethnic peoples’ collective
identities as indigenous peoples (Keyes 2002). In the consti-
tution, members of all ethnic groups are considered citizens
with equal socio-political and cultural rights.
Perhaps the most important state policy affecting the rela-
tionship between people and forests in Vietnam over the past
three decades was forestland allocation, which granted house-
holds the right to use previously state-owned forestland for
50 years irrespective of their ethnicity. By the end of 2013,
households possessed nearly a quarter of the country’s total
forestland area (Kiem 2014). In contrast, village communities
had received use rights to only 3 %.
Beyond forestland allocation, Vietnam’s forest policy has a
strong focus on distributive matters. With no significant gov-
ernance reforms, most attention has been on the implementa-
tion of large reforestation and forest protection programs. The
327 Program in the 1990s and 661 Program in the first decade
of the 2000s used large-scale central government financial
support to households throughout the country for forest pro-
tection and tree plantations. This emphasis also characterizes
the most recent policy initiative known as Payments for Forest
Ecosystem Services (To et al. 2012).
Forestland allocation has not put an end to nationwide dis-
putes over forests due to the discrepancy between state regu-
lations and customary use and management, which underlies
the persistence of logging deemed illegal by state rules but
often considered legal by villagers (McElwee 2004).
Villagers across the country have exploited timber from sur-
rounding forests even though they are under state protection
regulations (Cam 2011). Similarly, village communities often
manage areas that government statistics call forestland, bare
land, wasteland or unused land, for crop cultivation and ani-
mal husbandry (McElwee 2011). Forestland allocation may
even have intensified conflict over forest because it has often
implied a massive re-assertion of state control over land (Sikor
2011b).
Thus, Vietnamese state policy has been guided by the cen-
trality of the household as the subject of justice and distribu-
tive matters, and the state as the sole politico-legal adminis-
trator of justice, described here as ‘politics of possession’
tying household-based citizenship to state provision of eco-
nomic entitlements (see Sikor 2012). Yet these ideas continue
to lead to disputes over forests in many parts of the country
that are not only about what politico-legal institutions should
exercise authority over forests but also challenge notions of
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citizenship based in households and the focus on distribution
as the most critical dimension of justice.
Global Struggles Over REDD+
Indigenous peoples’ demands for self-determination have
been a central tenet of global struggles over REDD+. After
the 2007 conference endorsed preparatory work on REDD+
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and intense lobbying by indigenous peo-
ples and their supporters to include references to indigenous
peoples’ rights in UNFCCC decisions (Schroeder 2010),
UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16 identified ‘indigenous peoples,’
‘local communities,’ and ‘members of local communities’ as
subjects of justice next to the traditional concern with nation
states in global agreements – an unprecedented recognition of
indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ collective identi-
ties and rights in global forest regulations (Savaresi 2013;
Walbott 2014).
Another critical issue in global contestations over REDD+
has been controversy over the dimensions of justice to be
regulated in UNFCCC decisions. Indigenous and forest rights
activists demanded the inclusion of text speaking to the urgen-
cy of redistribution, such as the need for forest tenure reform
to formally recognize the customary use and management of
forests and the importance of equitable sharing of REDD+
benefits and burdens (Luttrell et al. 2013; Sunderlin et al.
2014). However, text addressing distributive matters at the
local or national levels is absent from the Cancun
Agreements, even though REDD+ at the global level is pri-
marily conceived as a distributive mechanism (Sikor 2013b).
Instead, UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16 defines participation and
recognition as the relevant dimensions of justice. The
so-called fourth REDD+ safeguard states the necessity of in-
volving relevant stakeholders in the design, development, and
implementation of REDD+ actions. Together with the refer-
ences to ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘local communities,’ the
third REDD+ safeguard provides certain recognition to forest
people’s historical experiences and particular stake in forests,
acknowledging their ‘knowledge and rights’ and alluding to
the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Walbott 2014).
The attention to indigenous peoples’ and local communi-
ties’ rights has implications for the recognition of authority
beyond the nation-state, which has been another key demand
by international forest right activists. Drawing on UNDRIP,
activists demanded to make the principle of Free Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) a prerequisite for the design and
implementation of REDD+ actions, which would have
obliged governments, international organizations, and the pri-
vate sector to consult and cooperate with potentially affected
peoples and communities through their own representative
institutions (Savaresi 2013). Nevertheless, the UNFCCC
decision eventually did not depart from the traditional focus
on nation states. States represented through their governments
are the key designers and implementers of REDD+ programs
and are in charge of implementing and reporting on the
REDD+ safeguards.
While UNFCCC decisions recognize forest peoples’
collective identities, the Vietnamese state continues to
emphasize equal individual rights to forest and land
regardless of ethnicity. The focus on participation and
recognition in the REDD+ safeguards is juxtaposed with an
emphasis on distributive matters in Vietnam. The conceptions
of authority enshrined in UNFCCC decisions and Vietnam’s
constitution overlap in their sole focus on the state, yet they
encounter resistance both globally and within Vietnam. The
REDD+ pilot project we examine here brought a lot of these
elements together: it was implemented by a Vietnamese NGO,
which we call Verda funded by NORAD, and supported by
the international advocacy group for indigenous rights,
Tebtebba.3
Negotiations Over Forest on the Ground:
The REDD+ Pilot
Verda began implementation of the REDD+ pilot project in
the middle of 2010. This involved identification of a site,
including a particular forest to be targeted for protection, de-
ciding what villagers to involve, development of a protocol for
villagers’ participation, and consideration of what reward the
villagers would get in return for their participation.
Identifying a Project Site: Global, State and Customary
Rules
The NGO initially selected a commune that includes rich nat-
ural forest and is inhabited by a large majority of ethnic mi-
nority Tay people, in line with global REDD+ regulations.
However, 6 months into implementation, the provincial
People’s Committee decreed a stop to the project at the initial
site because it was within an area designated as national secu-
rity zone, which prohibited the presence of any project with
international involvement. In addition, the commune’s forest
belonged to a nature reserve, which meant that it was under
the management of a national-level protection board and thus
outside the local government’s mandate.
Verda consequently selected Linh Bong, a commune in the
same district, as the new implementation site, expecting to
avoid encountering similar bureaucratic barriers if they
targeted the limestone hills designated as forestland around
the commune’s 20 villages. As Chi Bach, the local project
3 We use pseudonyms for all persons, places, and organizations in
Vietnam to protect the anonymity of our informants.
220 Hum Ecol (2016) 44:217–227
coordinator, explained in 2014: ‘Most of the forestlands are
rocky hills without owners and are managed by the Commune
People Committee so that the implementation would be more
convenient.’ Since the forest located on the hills had not been
assigned to individual households under Vietnam’s forestland
allocation program, Verda assumed that it was ‘without
owners’ and would benefit from the introduction of suitable
management interventions. And because the hills were under
the formal management of the Commune People Committee,
no higher-level government units held a direct mandate over
the hills.
Verda was not concerned that much of the limestone hills
was bare of any forest, i.e., there was not much potential for
future deforestation or forest degradation that could be re-
duced: most of the trees that had covered the hills had been
cut down by villagers and other loggers during the 1990s.
Consequently, the villagers no longer attributed much eco-
nomic significance to area because no trees of commercial
value remained. As a villager observed with regret: ‘It would
have been better if the project were implemented here about
10 years ago, since at that time there were still a lot of big trees
in the forests’.
Despite awareness of the discrepancy with global REDD+
rules Verda included all the forestland located on limestone
hills in the REDD+ pilot. Having commissioned forest inven-
tories, they deemed about half of the forest (620 out of
1168 ha) as potentially suitable for REDD+ since they expect-
ed natural forest to regenerate there. However, after consulta-
tionwith the Commune People’s Committee, Verda decided to
include all the forestland on limestone hills in the project. Chi
Bach explained that theywanted to contribute to general forest
protection, as was common practice in Vietnam’s large-scale
forest protection programs.
The focus on the rocks helped to ensure that forest protec-
tion did not cause negative effects on villagers’ livelihoods
and customary land use, since the villagers used other forest-
land located on gentle slopes for crop cultivation, and consid-
ered that they have established possession of the land on a
customary basis since the 1950s, even though they have re-
ceived land titles to only a minor share of the land. The im-
portance of respecting customary rules was not lost on a com-
mune cadre who commented: ‘We respect the history of land
use practices as all non-rocky mountain forests are local peo-
ple’s production forests.’
Thus, Verda’s search for a suitable project site involved
intense negotiations with government officials and villagers.
The underlying question was about which rules should apply
to the designation of the project site: UNFCCC regulations,
the land use classifications and territorial zoning done by the
Vietnamese state, or customary rules practiced by villagers.
Verda initially found a site that met the rules of UNFCCC and
NORAD, as it had rich forest and a large majority of ethnic
minority Tay residents. Yet due to state regulations, they had
to move to a site with very little forest on rocky hills (and a
more complex ethnic mix – see below). Moreover, they ended
up including much forestland that they did not deem suitable
for REDD+ under the UNFCCC, while at the same time,
professing a strong commitment to respect villagers’ custom-
ary use of land in line with the global REDD+ safeguards.
Determining the Forest to be Protected: Conflict
Between Customary Uses and State Designations
When Verda moved the REDD+ pilot to Linh Bong it hoped
to include some 400 ha of dense natural forest located at the
periphery of the villages. However, on their first visit to the
commune it became clear that the forest was the subject of
dispute between Dao villagers of Linh Bong and a private
forest company from the neighboring province. The Dao of
Ba Don and Bu Don villages claimed customary rights to the
forest, but the company had obtained a land title from the
People’s Committee of the neighboring province after the for-
est had been transferred to its territory.
The Dao asserted customary rights to the land because they
were the first to arrive to the area and had cultivated the land
for many years. As an elderly man of Ba Don village
commented, ‘When I was a child, there were only Dao living
in this area. Today, there are about 12 Nung and 10 Viet
families but they are all new migrants. The Viet and the
Nung of this village do not have forests because they are
newcomers.’ The Dao did not consider that their rights ex-
tended to later settlers in the villages.
Until recently, the Dao had considered the land in dispute to
be their own. Their fields extended all the way to the border
with the neighboring province, which had followed a water-
shed since the first half of the twentieth century. The same
elderly Dao man explained, ‘Land at the far side of the hill
belongs to [the neighboring province], and this side belongs to
[our province].’However, in the late 1990s much of land used
by the Dao was transferred to the neighboring province under
a nation-wide territorial planning project. Once the transfer
took effect, the People’s Committee of the neighboring prov-
ince granted the land to a private forest company. Nonetheless,
the Dao were able to continue their customary use of the forest
another 10 years. The dispute erupted only after the People’s
Committee issued a land title to the company in 2011, and the
company constructed a new feeder road into the area, banned
any further use of the land, logged over some of the forest, and
started to plant trees.
The Dao villagers resisted their exclusion from the land by
all possible means. They initially wrote several petitions to the
Commune People’s Committee. When they got no a response,
they send another, this time to the District People’s
Committee, which caused the Commune People’s
Committee to criticize them for going over their heads.
Frustrated with the lack of responsiveness to their concerns,
Hum Ecol (2016) 44:217–227 221
the Dao took to violence in February 2012. About 70 Dao
women and men went to the land under dispute, beat up a
few company workers, and destroyed the company’s house
and office equipment. The violence caused the police of the
neighboring province to arrest four Dao men and a Dao wom-
an, including the head of Bu Don village, keeping them in jail
4 months and forcing them to pay some US$2800 to the com-
pany in compensation. In addition, a cadre from Linh Bong’s
People’s Committee came to the villages to confiscate land
titles that the Dao villagers had received for the disputed land
in the 1990s.
The Dao’s appeal for help to Verda did not yield a response.
Some of them raised the issue in a meeting with Verda attended
by its national director, reasoning that ‘Verda [was] encourag-
ing the local people to protect forests while the [company]
[was] destroying our watershed forests.’ They suggested that
‘it [was] not appropriate for Verda to not do anything to stop
them,’ considering the project was designed to protect forest.
But Verda did not include the land under dispute in the REDD+
pilot even though it had dense natural forest, protection of
which was the stated target of global REDD+ regulations. Chi
Bach, the coordinator, argued that they could not include the
forest because ‘we implement our pilot projects in land areas
with clear boundaries, not in disputed forests.B Verda could
become active only after the dispute was resolved.
The Company submitted their application for the land title
to the provincial People’s Committee after Verda had started
work in Linh Bong commune. Interviewed in April 2014, its
director said that they knew about ‘the project implemented by
international organizations’ in Linh Bong when they submit-
ted their application. He also mentioned that they were hoping
to Breceive benefits from REDD+ in the future^. To villagers,
the connection between the REDD+ pilot and the Company’s
actions was clear, as expressed by a Dao men from Bu Don:
‘The arrival of the REDD+ project here with a plan to
include all natural forests of the village into the project
caused the company to go there to keep the land […] the
company is afraid of losing both the natural forests and
swidden lands, so they went before us to take the land,
which in turn led to the conflict.’
Thus, Verda decided to ignore the dispute. It had to engage
in intense negotiations with villagers, government officials,
and the private company about which rules applied to the
implementation of the REDD+ pilot. The Dao of Ba Don
and Bu Don wanted recognition of their customary rights to
the forest. The local government upheld the administrative
boundaries set by the state through territorial zoning. The
company made specific moves to assert its control over the
land and establish a claim on future REDD+ benefits on the
basis of state law. Verda’s primary concern was getting
REDD + -like actions implemented, i.e., to designate
forestland for protection, measure forest parcels and conduct
forest inventories, even if the forest that was of highest impor-
tance according to UNFCCC rules was not included, and an
opportunity to address global concerns about indigenous peo-
ples’ customary rights was missed.
Deciding on Participants: Global Definitions, National
Citizenship, and Local Identities
The third issue Verda had to resolve was about which villagers
from Linh Bong should be targeted through the REDD+ pilot
and were eligible to participate.
Verda’s application submitted to NORAD stated that the
REDD+ pilot was designed to build the capacity of ethnic
minority communities to participate in REDD+ actions.
Ethnic minority people chosen to represent the indigenous
peoples flagged in global REDD+ regulations as deserving
special treatment and to whom REDD+ pilots should be
targeted. Consequently, Verda initially chose a commune for
project implementation where ethnic minority Tay people
accounted for almost the entire population. When it was
forced to move the project, one of the reasons that Linh
Bong was chosen was the presence of ethnic minorities.
However, Linh Bong’s settlement history and ethnic com-
position turned out to be complex. The commune’s population
of 5900 people belongs to a total of seven ethnic groups,
including large numbers of Nung, Tay, and Dao, as well as a
few Hmong, Cao Lan, and San Chi households. However,
majority Viet is the largest group (49 %) and their ancestors
had arrived in the area first - some families claim their ances-
tors came 17 generations ago. However, not all Viet families
claim descent from the first settlers. Others arrived as late as
1962–63 from the Red River Delta under a state resettlement
program. The first Dao families had come to Linh Bong seven
generations ago, followed by Nung and Tay families five gen-
erations ago. Many Nung and Tay had settled only in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when they joined the existing resi-
dents in collective wet-rice cultivation and established their
own upland fields around the villages.
Viet and Dao villagers took significant pride in the fact that
they had opened up the area for settlement and cultivation. For
example, a Dao elder recalled:
‘When I was a child, Bu Don had only seven families.
At that time, there were no ethnic [Tay] and Bu Don was
covered by very dense forest. I went to the forest to find
land to do shifting cultivation while my parents cultivat-
ed paddy fields at the foothills. The paddy field that my
parents cultivated had originally been developed by my
grandparents, who passed them on to my parents.’
When Linh Bong’s agricultural cooperatives divided up the
collective wet-rice fields under the general trend of
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decollectivization around 1990, it was the villages’ settlement
history that was considered, but not ethnicity per se. The vil-
lagers decided to restore wet-rice fields to their historical
owners and heirs in contrast to the state policy of distributing
agricultural fields equally among the current workforce. The
villagers’ decision meant that the Viet, Dao, Nung, and Tay
families who had settled in Linh Bong and established wet-
rice fields before 1960 received their fields back. Those Viet,
Dao, who had moved to Linh Bong from the 1960s onward
had joined the agricultural cooperatives after their arrival and
had never worked their own wet-rice fields.
Verda thus found itself in a delicate situation with regard to
the question of who was eligible for participation in the REDD+
pilot. The project proposal’s focus on ethnic minorities did not
match with local settlement history. More importantly, villagers
did not see any sense in distinguishing local residents by their
ethnicity. They commonly mentioned that all commune resi-
dents had a migration background, though some had arrived
earlier than others. In matters of production, they asserted that
all of them enjoyed equal rights. As a villager commented, ‘both
Viet and other ethnic groups have lived in the region together for
quite a long time. [… the project] could not be implemented
successfully without participation of Viet.’ Verda resolved the
dilemma by inviting all households in the commune to join the
REDD+ pilot, thereafter referring to ‘ethnic minorities and com-
munities living in and around forest’ as the project’s target
group. As Chi Bach explained, ‘it is true that this project is
designed for poor ethnic minority people, yet it could not be
done without inclusion of the Viet.’ This decision to include
villagers from all ethnic groups, whether minority or majority,
matches with the UNFCCC decision to identify ‘indigenous
people’, ‘local communities’ and ‘members of local communi-
ties’ as subjects of justice.
Developing a Protocol for Villagers’ Participation:
The Cooperatives
Once Verda had decided who would be eligible to participate,
it had to develop a specific protocol for participation.
International activists and UNDRIP were clear about a suit-
able means to enable indigenous peoples’ participation in
REDD+: consultation following the principle of FPIC.
Before any REDD+ action was designed or implemented,
potentially affected indigenous peoples should be consulted
through their own representative organizations. The emphasis
on FPIC, therefore, was on collective representation, as
reflected in the focus on ethnic minority communities in
Verda’s project application.
With approval by the Commune People’s Committee,
Verda founded two ‘agricultural, forestry and environment
cooperatives,’ each having a chairman and a management
board including the village heads and the leaders of the coop-
erative’s production units. Altogether, the cooperatives were
made up of a total of 60 self-management teams including
about 25 households each.
Membership in the cooperatives was voluntary. Any villag-
er who wanted to join was invited to submit an application for
household membership, to be signed by both the husband and
wife. The head of the self-management team and the cooper-
ative management board reviewed the application for approv-
al. Membership required households to ‘comply fully with all
regulations and rules of the cooperative and the self-
management team as well as Verda’s requirements.’
Additionally, if households did not want to join the coopera-
tives, they were obliged to sign a formal pledge that they
forewent any claims on future benefits disbursed by the coop-
eratives but would comply with ‘the regulations [of the coop-
erative] on forest use and management under the REDD+
demonstration project.’
According to Chi Bach, this procedure satisfied the de-
mands of FPIC. She did not mind that the cooperatives were
generally considered economic organizations and not consul-
tative mechanisms, and saw no discrepancy between the em-
phasis on collective consultation under FPIC and Verda’s in-
vitation to villagers to join the cooperatives on a household
basis. Similarly, she had no problem with giving villagers a
single choice about whether to join or not to join the cooper-
atives rather than consulting them more generally about vari-
ous options for forest protection.
The cooperative model was in line with government policy
and provoked no disapproval from villagers. Nevertheless, it
differed significantly from the globally agreed options for facil-
itating people’s participation in REDD+ projects, particularly
the FPIC principle. In Linh Bong, villagers had the choice of
opting in or out of activities determined and decided by Verda in
consultation with the Commune People’s Committee.
Rewarding Villagers: Agricultural Extension
The fifth issue that Verda had to address was about the nature
of rewards to villagers in return for forest protection. The
potential rewards ranged from cash payments and the provi-
sion of material assistance to activities that would enhance
villagers’ role in forest governance or support the recognition
of the immaterial values that they might attribute to the forest.
As noted, the global REDD+ Safeguards emphasize efforts to
increase people’s participation in forest governance, recogniz-
ing their knowledge, and protecting their rights.
When Verda assigned specific parcels of forestland to the
self-management teams for protection, it sought to make sure
that villagers would also have rights to the land and the ben-
efits derived from it. Verda arranged for the measurement of
all forest parcels by technical experts and their mapping in
collaboration with villagers. It distributed the forestland to
all self-management teams in parcels of 25 ha each, demarcat-
ed the forest parcels in the field, and put up signs banning any
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further logging. On its request, the District People’s
Commi t t e e i s sued a dec i s i on tha t g r an t ed the
self-management teams tenure rights to the parcels for a peri-
od of 50 years. However, Verda did not request the People’s
Committee to issue legal land titles to villagers, as those would
have required complex bureaucratic procedures involving var-
ious government units.
Even though the forest parcels possessed little material value
and no land titles were issued, their assignment to the
self-management teams caused significant debate among the
villagers. Villagers initially wanted to distribute forest parcels
among teams on the basis of geographical proximity, a proposal
that Verda and the Commune People’s Committee approved.
Nevertheless, the allocation principle remained subject to ongo-
ing debate at several cooperative meetings. Moreover, after vil-
lagers inspected the forest parcels in question and discovered
that the forest was of better quality in the more remote locations,
many changed their demands and now wanted to be allocated
parcels in remote areas. The issue was finally resolved when
Verda promised that future revenues from REDD+ would be
distributed equally among all self-management teams indepen-
dent of the actual carbon contained in their respective forest
parcels. In Chi Bach’s words, the revenues would be ‘shared
between people managing rocky hills with forest and people
managing rocky hills without forest.’
In addition, Verda provided various kinds of support to
local agriculture in reward of villagers’ involvement in forest
protection. Helped by their director’s background as an agri-
cultural expert, Verda implemented various ‘livelihood im-
provement activities’ promoting the cultivation of commercial
crops although there was no direct link between those and the
protection of the degraded forest on the rocky hills. They used
the cooperatives to supply seed and fertilizer to villagers for
the cultivation of various cash crops and contracted extension
experts to train villagers in improved cultivation techniques.
They also granted the two cooperatives a loan of US$28,000
to generate immediate material benefits to villagers and there-
by encourage their involvement in the cooperatives.
Consequently, the REDD+ pilot came known to many vil-
lagers as an ‘agricultural extension project.’
Distributive concerns were thus at the core of discussions
about the implementation of the REDD+ pilot in Linh Bong.
All involved actors – Verda, the Commune People’s
Committee, and villagers – emphasized issues of distribution
with regard to what villagers received in return for their involve-
ment in forest protection. Since the forest had no significant
material value, agriculture became the focus for the provision
of material benefits.
Politics of Justice in Linh Bong
The negotiations over forest we have described were not sim-
ply about the practical conduct of the REDD+ pilot but
involved contestations over the meaning of forest justice.
The questions Verda, villagers, and the local government dealt
with about where the project should be implemented, what
areas should be targeted, who should participate, how people
should participate, and what villagers should get in return for
forest protection, all touched on matters of justice. The con-
testations were centered on specific issues of justice, such as
the dispute between the Dao and the company and the ques-
tion how forest parcels should be distributed among self-
management teams. Simultaneously, they addressed the core
parameters of justice: subjects, dimensions, and authority.
Different ideas about subjects of justice underlay the de-
bates about who should participate in the REDD+ pilot, and
how participants should be involved. Verda’s application to
NORAD struck a compromise between global REDD+ poli-
tics and Vietnamese law, highlighting a priority concern with
ethnic minority communities but avoiding any further impli-
cations of indigenous peoples’ agenda. Ethnic minority com-
munities took the place that indigenous peoples had held in a
previous international collaboration, which had involved
Verda as the national partner and was led by the international
advocacy group Tebtebba. In that project, Verda had stated its
goal as ‘ensuring the effective participation of indigenous
peoples in global and national REDD processes’ [emphasis
added].4 In the new project, it replaced the term ‘indigenous
peoples’ with ‘ethnic minorities,’ a common practice in
Vietnam. At the same time, Verda retained the emphasis on
collective identities by speaking of ethnic minority
communities.
When the project was implemented, villagers, Verda and
the local government agreed to invite all households in Linh
Bong to participate, and Verda quickly modified its language
to refer to ‘ethnic minorities and communities living in and
around forest’ (emphasis added). In practice, project activities
engaged participants as individual households, which
reflected a general consensus in Linh Bong that ethnicity did
not differentiate villagers’ rights to land and forest. Instead,
villagers’ rights depended on the labor that households had
invested in land. Because no household had invested any labor
in the forestland on the rocks, no one could claim any prefer-
ential rights to the forestland included in the REDD+ pilot.
Similarly, there was not much debate about the appli-
cable dimensions of justice in Linh Bong. From the outset,
Verda, villagers and the local government shared the pre-
mise that villagers deserved material rewards in return for
forest protection. Their focus was squarely on the distrib-
utive dimension of justice in the form of agricultural sup-
port and tenure rights to forestland.
4 See http://www.indigenousclimate.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=92:cerda&catid=37:our-partners&Itemid=84,
accessed 16/09/2014
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For most villagers, this was a question of how much agri-
cultural support Verda would deliver to them in return for
forest protection, and how the support was distributed among
households. They did not mind that Verda set up economic
cooperatives to organize interactions with villagers, and dic-
tated the rules governing them. They appreciated Verda’s ef-
forts to strengthen their tenure rights to the rocky hills, and
engaged in a prolonged discussion about how parcels should
be distributed among the self-management teams. For the af-
fected Dao, rights to forestland were a more serious matter, as
demonstrated by their resort to violence in their struggle
against the company. Ultimately, they were the only people
in Linh Bong who felt negatively impacted by the REDD+
pilot since their distributive demands found no support from
the local government or Verda.
In terms of authority, Verda constantly had to decide whose
rules applied to their project – those of the UNFCCC,
Vietnamese law and policy, or customary practice. It had to
move the project away from the original site to Linh Bong due
to Vietnamese national security concerns. In Linh Bong, it
avoided targeting forestland on the gentler slopes where vil-
lagers had effectively established customary claims to its use
for crop cultivation. At the same time, Verda did not support
Dao customary claims to forest against state delineations and
the company. As a result, the REDD+ pilot ended up
protecting highly degraded forestland and inviting all house-
holds to get involved.
While broader authority relations remained contested in
Linh Bong, the state became the primary politico-legal insti-
tution of distributive justice for households. The District
People’s Committee issued the decision to grant
self-management teams tenure rights to the rocky hills. It
was also state law and regulations that led Verda to set up
the cooperatives for organizing forest protection and assisting
agriculture. And it was with reference to state law that it re-
fused to lend support to the Dao villagers’ customary claims.
Verda’s REDD+ pilot thus served the consolidation and ex-
tension of state authority in Linh Bong.
Conclusion: Politics of Justice and REDD+
Justice is a key element in negotiations over REDD+
practices as they develop in situations of ongoing conflict
over forest, not only in terms of the distributive, proce-
dural and recognition issues raised by REDD+, but also
because the various stakeholders attribute different mean-
ings to justice in specific contexts. The contestations in-
volve competing ideas about the subjects of justice, the
dimensions of justice considered relevant, and authority
realizing justice. They influence the arrangements recog-
nized as REDD+ and their prospects to contribute to cli-
mate change mitigation and just forest governance.
Similar to what we observed in the REDD+ pilot in
Vietnam, we surmise that REDD+ projects witness politics
of justice in other places, on the ground as well as in debates
at the national and global levels. The actors involved in
REDD+ actions are likely to disagree on the meaning of jus-
tice along the key parameters of subjects, dimensions, and
authority. Politics of justice may play a role in policy debates
about the equitable distribution of REDD+ finance and re-
sponsibilities among countries (Di Gregorio et al. 2014), the
recognition of indigenous peoples at the global level (Savaresi
2013), or forest tenure reform as a vehicle to redistribute forest
rights or recognize customary authority (Mahanty et al. 2013).
Contestations over the meaning of justice also underlie the
concerns of REDD+ practitioners over benefit distribution
systems (Luttrell et al. 2013). Yet, politics of justice may more
often remain implicit to practical matters of REDD+ design
and implementation, such as the measurement of carbon
stocks (Sikor 2013b).
Contestations over the meaning of justice influence the
governance arrangements known as REDD+ in ways similar
to struggles over knowledge and technology. The meanings
and implementation of justice are critical elements of the re-
lations between those seeking to govern and those whose con-
duct is to be governed. It is possible that some meanings may
become dominant, assuming a force equivalent to the con-
struction of certain knowledge truths about forests (Forsyth
and Walker 2008) and conservation (Carrier and West 2009).
Yet the meaning of forest justice may also remain contested,
resulting in a perplexing variety of actual REDD+ practices,
such as rewarding villagers for the protection of rocks in
Vietnam.
Contestations over justice pose a radical challenge to global
efforts of defining REDD+ in terms of certain technologies and
practices. Themulti-sited nature of contestations over themean-
ing of justice challenges the simplifications required by global-
level attempts to institute uniform regulations for forest-based
climate change mitigation (Mahanty and McDermott 2013).
Global perspectives on the needs, interests and rights of indig-
enous peoples may not match the claims and notions of forest
justice asserted by marginalized people at the local or national
level (Li 2002). Ideas about self-determination, local gover-
nance, and customary authority may not have much traction
in many contexts with disempowered people, who view the
nation state as a more desirable politico-legal institution for
realizing justice (Ribot et al. 2008). Emphasis on procedural
justice and recognition, as reflected in the importance attributed
to FPIC by indigenous advocacy groups, may not meet the
expectations of marginalized people who prioritize distributive
matters (cf. Upton 2014).
Nevertheless, global regulation, in particular the REDD+
safeguards, has potential to serve forest justice. REDD+ may
develop into a platform that helps to empower marginalized
people by asserting universal goals if safeguard processes
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simultaneously provide sufficient space for adaptation to mar-
ginalized people’s specific ideas about justice (Forsyth and
Sikor 2013). However, one can also envision other scenarios
of how global safeguards will not help just causes. They may
not help to bring about justice simply because they may not
develop enough traction on the ground due to the
overpowering influence of local and national definitions of
justice. At the same time, global safeguards may even work
to undermine efforts to make forest governance more just if
they impose rigid categories on national and local politics of
justice, or if national and local implementers employ
top-down approaches to operationalize forest justice.
Overall, REDD+ may witness Vietnamese villagers
protecting rocks, but it may not be on the rocks yet. The
politics of justice highlighted in this paper may look like a
constraint on the implementation of global ideas and rules
about REDD+ from a narrowly technocratic perspective.
However, a switch of perspective may help REDD+ designers
and implementers to recognize the potentials of engaging with
justice concerns actively (cf. Gritten et al. 2009). Ideas of
justice have always been integral to forestry, assuming a cen-
tral place in everyday negotiations over forest practices and
constituting a central tenet of professional forestry. Renewed
attention to justice, particularly differences in ideas about jus-
tice, may help policy-makers, professionals, activists and vil-
lagers to recognize the potential of justice concerns as moti-
vation for sustainable forest management. Thus, REDD+ may
provide a new opportunity to take a fresh look at not only
forest justice but also more broadly at sustainable forest
management.
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